Skip to content
Writing
NewMTA-STSTLS-RPTSecurityDNSDeliverability

MTA-STS and TLS-RPT in 2026: Enforcing Strict Email Transit Encryption

Standard SMTP opportunistic TLS (STARTTLS) is vulnerable to downgrade attacks. Here is how to configure MTA-STS policy files and TLS-RPT records for enterprise email transit security.

The Fatal Vulnerability of Opportunistic STARTTLS

When SMTP was originally conceived, all message exchange was unencrypted. Decades later, RFC 3207 introduced STARTTLS to allow servers to negotiate encrypted TLS sessions. However, STARTTLS was implemented opportunistically: if an upstream server does not advertise STARTTLS, or if an on-path network adversary intercepts the TCP handshake and strips the STARTTLS command (a STRIPTLS attack), mail servers silently fall back to transmitting messages in cleartext.

In corporate networks, healthcare systems, and fintech applications, cleartext fallback exposes sensitive verification tokens, financial invoices, and autonomous agent communications to passive wiretapping. MTA-STS (RFC 8461) and TLS Reporting (RFC 8460) solve this by establishing an authoritative, cryptographically enforced TLS mandate.

1. Publishing the Authoritative MTA-STS Policy File

MTA-STS requires hosting a strict policy file served over HTTPS with a valid public TLS certificate at the well-known subdomain https://mta-sts.yourdomain.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt:

TEXT
version: STSv1
mode: enforce
mx: feedback-smtp.us-east-1.amazonses.com
mx: *.sadasend.com
max_age: 604800

2. Configuring DNS Announcement & Telemetry Records

Two DNS TXT records announce the policy to receiving mail servers and configure automated aggregate reporting for encrypted transit failures:

DNS
; 1. MTA-STS Discovery Record (increments id when policy updates)
_mta-sts.yourdomain.com.  IN TXT  "v=STSv1; id=2026100901;"

; 2. TLS-RPT Aggregate Diagnostic Reporting Record
_smtp._tls.yourdomain.com. IN TXT "v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:tls-reports@sadasend.com;"

MTA-STS Operational Modes & Rollout Strategy

ModeBehaviorRisk LevelRecommended Duration
testingLogs TLS failures via TLS-RPT but delivers email unencrypted if TLS failsZero (No dropped email)2 to 4 weeks (Validation phase)
enforceRefuses connection and bounces email if valid TLS certificate cannot be verifiedSecure (Prevents MITM tampering)Permanent production state
noneExplicitly disables MTA-STS policy enforcementLow securityEmergency rollback only

Verifying MTA-STS Policy and TLS-RPT via Terminal

You can inspect policy accessibility and TLS certificate validity directly from your terminal using curl and openssl:

BASH
# 1. Verify HTTPS policy endpoint (must return HTTP 200 with valid TLS cert):
curl -sSL https://mta-sts.yourdomain.com/.well-known/mta-sts.txt

# 2. Verify discovery TXT record:
dig +short TXT _mta-sts.yourdomain.com

# 3. Test SMTP TLS handshake with MX destination:
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mail.sadasend.com:25 -servername mail.sadasend.com

Why MTA-STS is vital for autonomous AI agents

When autonomous AI agents dispatch automated financial reports, system alerts, or API keys, preventing on-path tampering is non-negotiable. Enforcing MTA-STS guarantees that no intermediary can intercept or read transactional payloads in transit.

Free plan

Building AI agents that send email?

Scoped API keys, per-key recipient allowlists, approval mode and a hosted MCP server with ten tools — on the free plan, without a card.